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Income Smoothing and Self Control 
The Case of Schoolteachers 
 
Close to half the California school districts let teachers choose whether to receive 
their salaries ten monthly payments or in twelve. Fisherine intertemporal 
maximization implies that they should choose ten payments and earn interest on their 
savings for their summer. But about half choose twelve installments , even though 
when summed over a reasonable period the foregone interest is considerable. This 
can be explained by the cost of exercising self control and by Laibson’s model of 
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 Experimental economics is frequently criticized on the grounds that the incentives offered to 
subjects in the laboratory are too low to give the results any validity. In particular, when the 
results reject the standard economic maximizing model, the presumption is frequently made that 
anomalies will go away if incentives are raised to levels faced in the “real world.”  Indeed as 
Camerer and Hogarth have recently noted, (1999) it is “an open question what results from the 
laboratory tell us about incentives in naturally occurring environments.”  
 In this paper we report the choices made by subjects in one such naturally occurring 
environment, the choice of payment pattern by California public schoolteachers. We calibrate the 
size of their incentives and show that not insignificant amounts of income are given up by large 
numbers of individuals (all of whom are college graduates) to implement what may be 
considered a  sensible consumption plan , but one that is not optimal according to the standard 






                                                
1 The Choice Problem. 
 Teachers usually work ten months in a twelve month academic year,  so that if they are paid 
only during their working period they receive no salary in July and August.  In the standard 
economic model of intertemporal financial planning, however, the absence of summer checks 
would present no problem since  teachers could simply save at interest some fraction of their 
salary, arranging whatever summer consumption pattern was desired within the overall budget 
constraint.     
Several authors (e.g. Thaler (1980), Schelling (1984),  Thaler and Sheffrin(1981),  
Loewenstein(1992), Laibson(1997), Prelec (1992) and Rabin (1997)) have questioned the 
validity of the standard model and proposed an alternative approach
1.  In this new approach the 
teacher may well agree that the optimal plan is to smooth consumption by saving at interest 
during the earning months, but executing this optimal plan  is not without cost. Thaler and 
Sheffrin, who explicitly note the schoolteachers’ planning problem,   argue that these 
implementation costs, or costs of self control, could change the behavior of teachers and make 
them willing to enter an implicit savings program at zero interest even though that would lower 
the present value of their income. An obvious question for field investigation is “how many do 
this and at what cost?” In addition for those teachers who enter such schemes, it is of interest to 
know if they see themselves as being challenged by issues of self control. 
 
 
1 Frederick et al [2002]  provide a recent overview of this literature  
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2 Data and Results:  
Our data come from two  questionnaires (shown in Appendices A and B). The first questionnaire 
was sent to 259 school districts in California
2. Replies with usable data were received from 130 
districts (50 percent).   A follow-up telephone survey checked on the possibility that a school 
district might pay interest to teachers who take the salaries that they earn over ten months in 
twelve monthly installments, and also that teachers might choose to be paid over an eleven 
months period
3. A second questionnaire was sent to all teachers in one of the school districts 
identified in the first survey as offering a twelve months payment option. This survey examined 
the motives of those teachers who chose to be paid over 12 months. 
   In our sample, 71 school districts (55%) did not offer their employees any choice of salary 
arrangement.  Of these, 37 (with 15,205 teachers)  paid salaries on a 10 months basis, 15 (with 
11,284 teachers)  paid on a 12 months basis and  10 districts paid teachers who work 10 months 
on a 10 month basis and those who work 12 months 12 times.
4  
Thus there were 59 school districts (45%) , employing 29,103 teachers which offered a choice of 
payment pattern, so that our sample is large.





2 The other California districts were included in a pilot survey that was not used here.  
3  We were alerted to this possibility by one district - which we excluded - that does pay such interest. None of the 
others that we questioned in the follow-up survey do this. We could not reach a few districts because they had not 
supplied an address or phone number. But since we found only two districts (which we have eliminated) that did pay 
interest, and very few that allow teachers to chose an eleven months pay period, we assumed that none of the 
districts that our follow-up survey failed to reach does either of these.  
4In addition, 3 districts volunteered the information that they pay on an 11 month basis. One district (with 14 
teachers) pays 3 checks in June, and the information from 5 districts is ambiguous. 
5 It is not clear how the respondents accounted for part-time teachers and some appear to have included non-teaching 
personnel when answering the question about the number of teachers in their district. This introduces some error 
because the percentages for all teachers were calculated by multiplying the percentages choosing a particular salary 
by the number of teachers in each district.   
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payments receive three checks in June. Presumably districts do this to avoid having to administer 
a payroll during the summer months, and participating teachers prefer this arrangement to being 
paid in ten installments because it requires less self control not to cash their July and August 
checks prematurely than to avoid spending funds that accumulate in their deposits during the 
academic year. We therefore treated these teachers as though they chose twelve payments. Table 
1 shows the pay preferences.  
Insert Table 1 here. 
As can be seen, of the approximately 30,000 teachers in our sample who were given the choice 
of a savings plan at zero interest some 15,000 took it. How much did this choice cost in terms of 
foregone income? 
3 The Costs of Deferring Income: 
To answer this question we need to know the teacher’s salary, the salary path, and the interest 
rate. These data are not available. Instead we offer some calculations of foregone salary under a 
number of possible scenarios. 
We begin by noting the range of teacher’s salaries. For the twelve largest cities in California The 
median of the minimum salaries in the twelve largest California cities in 2001 was $35,981 for 
teachers with a B.A. degree and the median of the maximum salaries for teachers with an M.A. was 
$54,491, (American Federation of Teachers, 2001, Table IV-1)  Given this range of salaries, we next 
calculated the present value of earnings lost by adopting the 12 month rather than the 10 month 
option for a number of possible salaries and interest rates, see Table 2. Note that when a teacher has 




6 All sums were discounted at the interest rate shown. may have access to higher yielding assets than its teachers. Such access could, of course, increase 
average salaries for a teacher who deferred income, but given this higher salary, any teacher who 
chose the 12 month option over the 10 month option at zero interest is still leaving on the table the 
dollar sums given in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here  
Since teachers will choose different asset portfolios, there is no obvious single interest rate which 
can be used to measure income forgone. The 1 per cent and 2 per cent rates measure roughly the 
foregone interest income using as an alternative someone who places one sixth of each month’s 
salary into a checking account. The 7% measures the forgone return on equities at the historical 
rate of return, and the 18% measures the income saved if a credit card debt is paid down. For 
teachers who are capital rationed, the relevant rate may even exceed 18%, and for some, 
probably many, teachers, one should add to the explicit yields  the liquidity services they obtain 
from holding liquid assets in place of a claim for accrued pay. All measures are shown on a 
present value basis. For interest rates between those given, income loss can easily be 
approximated by extrapolation 
As can be seen, a starting teacher who chooses the 10 months option and uses the accelerated 
payment schedule to pay down credit card debt could have the same  
consumption stream as the teacher who chooses the 12 months option and have approximately 
$400 left over 
6. Of course the loss at the rate on checking accounts is much smaller and for one 
year may be considered inconsequential. 
Presumably most teachers who enter a zero-interest saving plan intend to do so for more than one 






                                                
substantial.
7 Relating this sum to the cost of self control, however, requires careful interpretation. 
Consider, for example, the 10 year loss for a teacher earning $42,000 per annum for whom the 
relevant rate is 18%. Table 2 shows that this sum amounts to $2503. 
Since a teacher who receives 10 payments per year has to exercise self control 120 times during 
a 10 year period, she is paid, in effect, $20.86 for each instance of exercising control given the 18 
percent rate, or $13.66 given the 7 percent rate, or $5.27 using the 2 percent rate. However, the 
burden of exercising self control need not be constant for these ten years. It seems highly 
plausible that here, too, there is "learning by doing", so that the burden falls over time. Teachers 
who are aware of this may therefore choose the ten months option, even though the first few 
times the interest earned is insufficient to compensate them for exercising self control.  
As Table 2 shows, when summed over a period long enough to correspond to a reasonable estimate of a 
teaching career, the income foregone by choosing twelve payments is substantial, and much greater than 
the levels of compensation used in laboratory experiments. Hence, even though teachers can change their 
pay arrangements next year at the cost of overcoming inertia and spending some time, they do have an 
incentive to think about their choice more carefully than do the subjects of laboratory experiments. 
Moreover, in this case we do not have to worry that motives arising from the experimental situation, such 
as trying to please the  experimenter, play any role. 
4 Implications  
 The standard model of the teacher’s choice of payment mechanism views the allocation problem 






7 There is the possibility that payment over twelve months might maximize teachers’ income by shifting the period 
over which they are paid for the summer months to a time when their salaries are higher, either because of a general  
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Assuming we can write intertemporal preferences in an additively separable form, and assuming 
geometric discounting at a constant rate, the problem becomes  
 
   Max. ∑i=0, 11 U(C i) /(1+ δ )
 i                                                                              (1)  
        s.t. ∑ i =0, 11  Ci  /(1+r)
 i = ∑ i =0, 9  Y
 /
 (1+r) 
i   =  Y ∑ i =0, 9  1/(1+r) 
i             (2) 
where r is the constant monthly interest rate, Y is income and C is consumption.  The solution to 
this problem is well known to be  
          
          C(i) = C(0) [(1+r)
 i / (1+δ )
i ]
       i =   1,11
                          (3)
                                                              
 
where initial consumption C(0) is chosen to satisfy the budget constraint (2). Because of (3), 
total utility is a monotonically increasing function of initial consumption C(0) which in turn is a 
monotonically increasing function of the present value of income. In terms of this model, 
choosing the 12 months payment option lowers the present value of income, so it is neither 
income nor utility maximizing and is not predicted by the model.  
Issues of self control, however, offer an explanation for this anomalous behavior.  
Self control  issues do not arise in the standard intertemporal model because as time moves 
forward, the consumption plan in (3) chosen in September remains optimal for each remaining 
month. As Strotz (1955) first showed, this “time consistency” is a mathematical consequence of 





salary increase, or because they have moved up on the payment ladder. Neither of these possibilities materialized in  
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Suppose, however, that discounting was not geometric. As a simple alternative, suppose that 
teacher’s preferences are represented by the function   
    U(C0, ...Cn ) =  U(C0 ) +  β ∑   U(C i) /(1+ δ )
 i                                                      (4) 
where C0 is current consumption and the summation is over the remainder of the planning year, 
Phelps and  Pollak  (1968). Objective functions with this structure are said to display hyperbolic 
discounting, see Laibson (1997) and for a critical viewpoint, see Rubinstein ( 2002) 
Assume also that the teacher’s pay cycle starts in September.  Now it is clear that as seen from 
September where both June and July consumption are affected by the factor β, the trade off 
between consumption in June (the last paid month) and consumption in July (the first non- paid 
month) would look quite different from the way it looks in June. In the later month, only July is 
discounted by the factor β. This fact that the trade off between two future months depends on 
which month it is viewed from leads to time inconsistency in planning, and poses the obvious 
question of which month’s  preferences the teacher will respect.  Since the teacher must now be 
thought of as having multiple preference systems (multiple selves), any attempt to limit decisions 
made according to the preferences of  the current month’s decision maker leads to issues of self 
control. 
 With this non-geometric discounting a very different picture of the teacher’s 12 months choice 
emerges. If a teacher realizes in September that a decision which favors September over July 
consumption  is an artifact of the beta discounting of July’s consumption and that this  
discounting will disappear in July, she may decide to precommit to a program which executes 
 
 




later preferences rather than earlier preferences. Rabin (1997) calls this precommitment strategy 
“sophisticated” and with this nomenclature the teacher who chooses the 12 months zero interest 
option is displaying sophisticated behavior.  
This strategy of precommitment is not free. Table 2 is a measure of the income a sophisticated 
teacher would have to spend to avoid the consequences of allowing decision making to pass from 
month to month. However, we should note that in this context the income loss does not 
correspond to a utility loss, since a higher initial consumption in September can no longer be 
monotonically associated with a uniformly higher consumption stream, but may instead be a 
mistake (as viewed by later preferences).  The 12 payment strategy at zero interest is the 
predicted behavior for sophisticated agents in this type of model if the interest costs of self 
control are sufficiently high. Finally we note that if, as is frequently done, a test for utility 
maximization substitutes income for utility, this data reject the utility maximizing model. 
       To be sure our data show that only half of the teachers actually follow the 12 months rule.  
Without further inquiry we cannot describe the behavior of the other half who choose the 10 months 
option. They may be what Rabin calls “naive” in that they fail to give any weight to future preferences and 
simply use the preferences of the current month to allocate income or they may be fully aware of the 
potential advantages of pre-commitment, but, because they face high costs of self control, are still unable 
to do it.   Finally they may be following the Fisher model by setting up a private saving scheme at interest 
as that model predicts. Without more detailed investigation we cannot tell. What we can say is that the 
Fisher model is rejected for one half of all teachers who were given the choice of a 12 months schedule 
and that over a lifetime this choice costs the teacher a significant amount of income. 
 
 
5 Surveying Individual Teachers   
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To elicit more information we sent a questionnaire (shown in Appendix B) to teachers in one of 
the school districts that offers a choice of pay systems
8. Table 3 shows the responses to some of 
the questions
9.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
Other questions asked whether the teacher is on a ten or twelve months pay schedule - 45 percent 
responded that they were on a ten month schedule -, and about whether anyone with whom the 
teacher pools income receives a salary in July and August.  The responses to the questions about 
income pooling are not shown in Table 3, or used to analyze separately those respondents who 
do no pool income, because of the limited number of such responses, but are shown in Appendix 
Table 1 
We obtained 122 responses with at least some useful information, a response rate of 32 percent 
percent. Given the personal nature of some of the questions, this response rate is reasonable, 
though it does, of course, raise a question about the representativeness of our sample - and its 
small size suggests that only tentative conclusions can be drawn from it. 
Although only one of the alternative responses in this survey provides information that bears 
directly on the prevalence of hyperbolic discounting, other responses provide indirect support for 
it because they are inconsistent with its main rival, the standard Fisher model. Thus, as 
previously discussed, that approximately half the respondents prefer to be paid in twelve 
installments suggests that their behavior cannot be explained by a model, such as the Fisher 





8 We are indebted to Richard Thaler for suggesting this survey 
9 In questions 2 and 3 respondents also had a choice of "other" with a space to write in an explanation. Several of 
these responses could readily be allocated to one of the other responses shown in Table 3. A number of respondents 
were asked to rank three alternatives, any alternative that was not checked received a ranking of 4.  
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This discrepancy between the standard Fisher model and the survey responses should, however, 
be viewed in its proper context. Suppose that the question had involved a large sum of money, 
say $100,000, with the interest lost by choosing ten installments being, say $2,000. Then, most 
respondents might well have cited the ability to earn interest as their reason for choosing ten 
installments. But many individual household decisions about spending or saving do involve 
relatively small sums that in the aggregate may be too important to be ignored by a model 
intended to explain savings decisions. 
Turning to respondents who chose twelve payments, one of the alternatives offered does provide 
direct support for a hyperbolic discount function. This is that, as Table 3 and Appendix Table 1 
show, to these respondents concern about having sufficient self control is an important a reason 
for choosing twelve payments. Half of them give this as their most important reason, thus 
identifying themselves as Rabin's "sophisticated" agents
10. 
 Another one of the three listed responses, "I have never considered any other way [than twelve 
payments] of saving for the summer", is also inconsistent with the Fisher model, and is more 
compatible with a satisficing model. (But here, too, had the potential gain from taking ten 
payments been much larger, presumably fewer teachers would have given this response.) Only 
the third response, that the potential interest earnings do not make it worth switching to ten 




10 Another alternative provided in this question is having sufficient other income not to have to worry about the 
absence of paychecks from the school district during the summer. We included this choice because it may be 
relevant for many respondents, and about one third chose it. It does not, however, provide much information, 
because, to keep the questionnaire simple, it had to be worded loosely, that is in terms of “worry” about saving for 
the summer, rather than in terms that can be more readily translated into the concepts of utility theory. Since a 
receipt of “other” income during the summer might confound our results, we also looked separately at those 
questionnaires that reported no summer income from pooling. The results were similar to those for the whole 





The opportunity for  many teachers to choose between being paid in 10 or in 12 month 
installments provides a natural experiment for testing the Fisher intertemporal utility maximizing 
model. And for about half the teachers it fails this test. The behavior of these teachers can, 
however, be explained by a hyperbolic discount function, or simply by including a term in the 














Number of Teachers                              Percent 
 
10 months                                    11,832                                        44 
11 months                                      1,169                                          4 
12 months                                     15,102                                        52 
 
Total                                             28,103                                      100 





















Income Lost By Choosing 12 Monthly Payments  
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                                                                                                             Income 
      30000 36000 42000 48000 54000 60000 66000
Present value 
summed over             Interest rate 
   1% 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
 2% 50 60 70 80 91 101 111
one year    4% 96 116 135 154 173 193 212
   7% 167 200 233 267 300 333 367
   18% 398 477 557 636 716 796 875
                
 1% 235 282 329 376 423 470 517
 2% 452 542 632 723 813 903 994
10 Years  4% 781 938 1094 1250 1406 1562 1719
 7% 1171 1405 1640 1874 2108 2342 2576
 18% 1788 2145 2503 2860 3218 3575 3933
                
   1% 448 538 627 717 806 896 986
 2% 822 987 1151 1315 1480 1645 1845
20 Years  4% 1309 1571 1833 2095 2356 2618 2880
 7% 1766 2120 2473 2826 3180 3533 3886
 18% 2129 2555 2981 3407 3833 4258 4684
   
   1% 641 769 897. 1025  1153.32 1281 1410
   2% 1126 1351 1577 1802 2027.1 2252. 2477
30 Years  4% 1666 1999 2332 2666 2998.09 3331 3664
   7% 2069 2483 2897 3311 3724.33 4138 4552














Responses of Teachers 
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                                                                                                    Respondents           Mean    Number of       
                                                                                                    Checking Item 
a      Score
b   Cases 
                                                                                                        
    Questions                                                                                       
                 
  
A, Asked of those receiving 10 payments: 
 
What is the reason you have chosen 10 payments? 
    a. I  realize that I need to have income over the summer 
         months,  but I can save enough from each paycheck to 
         have money in  the summer                                                        83.5                 2.43      67 
    b. I have sufficient income form other sources, so that I do 
        not  need to worry about  saving money for the summer  
        out of  each of the 10 paychecks.                                                 73.6                 2 .91     68.        
   c. That way I can earn interest on the money I save for the 
        summer.                                                                                        82.6                2.46       68 
 
B. Asked of those receiving 12 payments? 
 
What are the reasons you have chosen 12 payments? 
     a. I need money in the summer, so I arranged to be paid in   
        12 monthly installments, I have never considered any  
        other  way of saving for the summer.                                           71.9                 2.63      55 
     b. I have considered the possibility of being paid over 10  
         months,  and saving some of my pay each month, but am 
          afraid that if  I  tried that I would just spend the money  
         during the 10 months.                                                                  76.9                 2.34      55 
     c.  I  have considered being paid over 10 months, and saving 
         some  the money in a bank or elsewhere, but the interest rate 





Appendix Table 1 
 





a Percent of respondents who answered this question. Respondents were asked to check all of the reasons that are 
relevant for them, if possible in order of importance. 
 
b Scores range from 1 - the most important reason - to 4 for a reason that the respondent did not check. Hence the 




                           
 
                          0 
a            1        1.5 
b        2       3        4          NA         Mean Rank 
c 
 




2a                      na           13       12         7       2        20         68                 2.43 
2b                      na           15         2         3       3        31         68                2.91 
2c                      na           12       12         8       1        21         68                2.46 
 
3a                      na           27         0         5       1        34         55                2.63 
3b                      na           34         1         3       1        28         55                2.34 
3c                      na             5         1         5       4        52         55                3.53 
 
4a                      44           73       na       na      na        na           5                  .62 
4b                      38           78       na       na      na        na           6                  .67 
4c1                      9           53       na       na      na        na         60                  .85 
4c2                      9           13       na       na      na        na       100                  .59 
4d                        0             2         0      43 
d   33         19        25                2.72   
  
 Note: For the questions corresponding to each number see the questionnaire reproduced in the 
Appendix 
 
a.  Where applicable a zero denotes a “no” answer, and a 1 a “yes”,.     
                         
b.  Fractional responses denote cases where a  respondent checked two alternatives without ranking 
them. 
 
c. Low rank indicates that respondents gave high priority to this response 
 
















1.  Do you offer teachers the choice of 10 or 12 payments? 
 
a.  YES 
i.  If yes, how many (or what proportion) take the  
 
ii.  10 month option?  ________________ 
 
iii.  12 month option?  ________________ 
 
b.  N O        
i.  If no, do you pay all teachers in 10 or 12 installments? 
 
(1)  10 
 
(2)  12 
 
2.  Do teachers who start in September on a 12 month contract receive payment for the previous 
July or August? 
 
a.  NO 
 
b.  Y E S           
i.  If yes, when salaries are raised after July do teachers paid in 12 installments receive 
a retroactive increase to put them in the same position as teachers paid in 10 
installments? 
 
(1)  YES 
 
(2)  NO 
 
(3)  This issue does not arise in this District. 
 
 
3.  Approximately how many teachers did your district employ in the 1998-99 academic year?  
 
__________ 
If you don’t mind providing any of the following, please do so: 
       Your Name: 
       School District Name: 






SURVEY OF PAYMENT METHODS   
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Q.1. Is your salary paid over: 10 months [ ]     12 months [ ]      other [ ] please specify 
_____  
 Q.2. Did you receive a significant amount of salary from sources other than this District 
during: July or August 2000?     yes [ ]     no [ ]   
 Do you expect such salary in July or August 2001?     yes [ ]     no [ ]   
 If yes for either question, approximately what percent of your regular salary from 
your school does this represent?  July/August 2000 _____%, July/August 2001 _____%  
 Q.3. Many people base their budget decisions on more than one person’s salary.  For 
example, if  you are married, you may pool your salary with your spouse.    
 Does such pooling describe your situation in the summer of 2000?     yes [ ]     no [ ]   
 Do you expect it to describe your situation in the summer of 2001?    yes [ ]     no [ ]   
Q.4. Does the person with whom you pool your salary receive a salary check in July and 
 August?     yes [ ]     no [ ]   
 Q.5. Roughly speaking, what fraction of the combined salary is contributed  by your 
salary? _____  
 Q.6. Please answer this question only if you have chosen the 10-months option.  
Otherwise,  please go on to the next question.    
 What is the reason you have chosen the 10-month option?  If several reasons are 
relevant,  please mark the 1, 2, 3 in descending order of importance.  
 [ ] I realize that I need to have income for the summer months, but I can save enough 
 from each paycheck to have money in the summer, and earn interest on my savings.  
 [ ] I have sufficient income from other sources so that I do not need to worry about 
 saving money out of each of the 10 paychecks.  
 [ ] Other: Please specify: _______________________________________________  
  
 Q.7. Please answer this question only if you have chosen the 12-months option.   
 What is the reason you have chosen the 12-months option?  If several reasons are 
relevant,  please mark the 1, 2, 3 in descending order of importance.  
 [ ] I need the money in summer, so I arranged to have something withheld from my 
 paycheck each month.  I have never considered any other way of saving for the 
 summer.  
 [ ]  I have considered the possibility of being paid over 10 months and saving some of 
 my pay each month, but I am afraid that if I tried I would spend the money during  the 10 
months.  
 [ ] I have considered being paid over 10 months, and saving some of the money in a 
 bank or elsewhere, but the interest rate is too low to make this worth doing.  
 [ ] Other: Please specify: _______________________________________________  
  
 It is hard to specify in a questionnaire all the circumstances that may be relevant for 
every respondent.  So, if you would care to amplify any of your answers, or raise some 
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